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REVISITING IMMUTABILITY: COMPETING FRAMEWORKS 
FOR ADJUDICATING ASYLUM CLAIMS BASED ON 
MEMBERSHIP IN A PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP
Talia Shiff*
ABSTRACT
The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) defines a refugee as any person
who has a “well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.” An 
emerging issue in U.S. asylum law is how to define the category “membership of a 
particular social group.” This question has become ever-more pressing in light of 
the fact that the majority of migrants seeking asylum at the U.S.-Mexico border are 
claiming persecution on account of their “membership in a particular social 
group.” The INA does not define the meaning of “particular social group” and 
courts are split over the correct definition of the term. According to one approach, 
the focus should be on which immutable characteristics should be protected from 
systemic discrimination. According to a second approach, the focus should rather 
be on how members of a given society define the boundaries of the proposed group. 
Each framework centers the analysis on a fundamentally distinct set of questions 
and concerns. This Article outlines the development and conceptual basis of each 
framework, to show that an immutability-centered approach to defining particular 
social group generates more consistency in asylum decisions and broadens the 
scope of asylum to include women and victims of harm traditionally categorized as 
falling within the category of “private criminal activity.” This Article contributes 
to debates on asylum policy by shedding new light on how to define the contours of 
asylum status and proposing concrete means by which to accomplish change.
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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, an increasing number of migrants have begun 
seeking asylum at the U.S.-Mexico border. Many of these migrants 
hope to escape widespread domestic violence and other forms of 
gender-motivated harms.1 The Immigration and Nationality Act 
(INA) authorized the Attorney General to grant asylum if an alien 
is unable or unwilling to return to his or her country of origin 
based on “a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, 
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or 
political opinion.”2 An emerging issue in U.S. asylum law is wheth-
er victims of gender-motivated harms—such as domestic vio-
lence—are eligible for asylum as members of a “particular social 
group.” Circuit courts debate the matter and immigration judges 
have issued conflicting decisions on similar claims.3
Of the five protected grounds, the phrase “membership of a par-
ticular social group” is the most ambiguous, generating the most 
debate.4 The INA does not define “persecution on account of 
1. HILLEL R. SMITH, CONG. RES. SERV., ASYLUM AND RELATED PROTECTIONS FOR ALIENS 
WHO FEAR GANG AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 1 (2019).
2. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified as amended at 8 
U.S.C. §§ 1101, 1157–1159 (1980)).
3. Circuit courts debate whether victims of gender-motivated violence can constitute 
members of a particular social group for asylum purposes. Some have recognized social 
groups defined by gender. Fatin v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 12 F.3d 1233, 1240 
(3d Cir. 1993) (stating that “to the extent that the petitioner in this case suggests that she 
would be persecuted or has a well-founded fear that she would be persecuted in Iran simply 
because she is a woman, she has” identified herself as a part of a group within the interpre-
tation of asylum); see Cece v. Holder, 733 F.3d 662, 677 (7th Cir. 2013) (recognizing young 
women living alone in Albania as a particular social group); Perdomo v. Holder, 611 F.3d 
662, 663 (9th Cir. 2010) (recognizing a particular group of young women in Guatemala be-
tween the age of fourteen and forty who lived in the United States).
Other circuits have claimed that groups defined by gender alone, or in combination 
with other characteristics, are not cognizable for asylum purposes. Velasquez v. Sessions, 866 
F.3d 183, 197 (4th Cir. 2017) (holding that the petitioner’s asylum claim concerned person-
al, private conflict rather than persecution on a protected ground); Fuentes-Erazo v. Ses-
sions, 848 F.3d 847, 853 (8th Cir. 2017) (holding that the proposed group of “Honduran 
women in domestic relationships who are unable to leave their relationships” is not neces-
sarily cognizable for asylum purposes); Jeronimo v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 678 F. App’x 796, 802–
03 (11th Cir. 2017) (denying application of a woman who claimed membership in a group 
of “indigenous women who live with a domestic partner and who suffer abuse and cannot 
leave safely from that domestic partner relationship”); see also Blaine Bookey, Domestic Vio-
lence as a Basis for Asylum: An Analysis of 206 Case Outcomes in the United States from 1994 to 
2012, 24 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 107 (2013) (documenting the inconsistent outcomes of 
cases involving domestic violence and other forms of gender-motivated harms); Blaine 
Bookey, Gender-Based Asylum Post-In re A-R-C-G: Evolving Standards and Fair Application of the 
Law, 22 SW. J. INT’L. L. 1 (2016).
4. In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 232–33 (B.I.A. 1985).
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membership in a particular social group.”5 The Board of Immigra-
tion Appeals (hereinafter “the Board”) first defined the term in 
the seminal case, In re Acosta, where it held that a particular social 
group requires “a group of persons all of whom share a common, 
immutable characteristic . . . that the members of the group either 
cannot change, or should not be required to change because it is 
fundamental to their individual identities or consciences.”6 This 
legal standard has become the dominant view of the international 
community.7 Major common law countries like Canada, New Zea-
land, and the United Kingdom follow the In re Acosta “protected 
characteristic” approach.8
In the years after In re Acosta, the Board refined the legal stand-
ard for a particular social group, holding that the mere existence 
of a shared immutable trait was not enough to establish a cogniza-
ble particular social group for the purpose of asylum. Rather, the 
group also had to exhibit “particularity” and to be “socially distinct 
within the society in question.”9 The new “social distinction” ap-
proach shifted the focus of analysis away from the protected trait to 
the discernibility of the group’s outer limits; decision-makers be-
came less concerned about how the presence of a shared immuta-
ble trait warranted asylum protection, and more concerned with 
the extent to which members of a given society perceive the group 
to exist. The international community adheres to In re Acosta’s im-
mutability approach; but in recent years, U.S. courts have predom-
inantly relied on the social distinction approach to process asylum 
claims in terms of membership in a social group for gender-related 
harms.10 This study challenges the social distinction approach by 
examining its negative implications for asylum claims based on 
gender-motivated violence. The Board’s new social distinction ap-
proach undermines the “immutability” framework, set forth in In re 
Acosta, reaffirming a problematic distinction between “private” and 
“public” harms that courts have used to justify the denial of asylum 
5. See id.
6. Id. at 233.
7. Fatma E. Marouf, The Emerging Importance of “Social Visibility” in Defining a Particular 
Social Group and Its Potential Impact on Asylum Claims Related to Sexual Orientation and Gender,
27 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 47, 48 (2008).
8. Id.
9. In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 237 (B.I.A. 2014). The Board qualified the im-
mutability standard in In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 957 (B.I.A. 2006), holding that when 
defining a particular social group, “a relevant fact [is] the extent to which members of a so-
ciety perceive those with the characteristic in question as members of a social group.” By 
2014, the Board clarified that applicants seeking asylum must establish that their group is 
not only “composed of members who share a common immutable characteristic” but is also 
“defined with particularity, and . . . socially distinct within the society in question.” M-E-V-G-,
26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 227, 252 (B.I.A. 2014).
10. See Marouf, supra note 7, at 48.
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to victims of gender-motivated violence.11 Specifically, in its focus 
on how members of a given society define the proposed group, it 
reifies preexisting societal subdivisions often to the detriment of 
women who, while subject to systemic discrimination, do not fit 
within mainstream societal subdivisions.
This Article argues that the Board should readopt immutability 
as the primary standard for defining membership in a particular 
social group. Restrictions on asylum eligibility should not focus on 
the particularity and social discernibility of group boundaries, but 
rather on whether there is nexus between the individual’s pro-
posed grouping and the alleged claim of persecution. This ap-
proach is consistent with recent Seventh Circuit decisions, in which 
the court rejected the Board’s social distinction approach in favor 
of an immutability-centered approach for defining “membership 
of a particular social group.”12 An immutability-centered approach 
to defining membership in a particular social group provides for 
more consistency in asylum decisions. Moreover, in focusing asy-
lum status determinations on the question of who is deserving of 
asylum, rather than on the breadth of a legally constructed group, 
it provides protection to women and victims of non-standard forms 
of harm traditionally categorized as falling within the category of 
“private criminal activity.”
Part I of this Article outlines the “immutability” approach to so-
cial group claims, which the Board set-forth in In re Acosta. This in-
cludes a discussion of the historical roots of Acosta’s immutability 
approach in U.S. equal protection jurisprudence and how the 
meaning of immutability changed when it migrated from equal
protection cases to the context of asylum. Specifically, three con-
secutive decisions defined the meaning of immutability as a crite-
rion for group membership, each of which associated immutability 
with innate identity traits: sexual orientation, kinship ties, and 
gender.13 These traits, in turn, shaped how decision-makers applied 
11. In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 320 (A.G. 2018) (“Generally, claims by aliens pertain-
ing to domestic violence or gang violence perpetrated by non-governmental actors will not 
qualify for asylum. While I do not decide that violence inflicted by non-governmental actors 
may never serve as the basis for an asylum . . . in practice such claims are unlikely to satisfy 
the statutory grounds for proving group persecution that the government is unable or un-
willing to address.”).
12. See, e.g., Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611 (7th Cir. 2009); Cece v. Holder, 733 F.3d 
662, 677 (7th Cir. 2013).
13. The Board published three precedent decisions during the 1990s, each of which 
recognized a distinct identity-trait as immutable. In re Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. 819, 
822–23 (B.I.A. 1990) (holding that sexual orientation is an immutable characteristic that 
defines membership of a particular social group); In re H-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 337, 342 (B.I.A. 
1996) (stating “that clan membership is a highly recognizable, immutable characteristic that 
is acquired at birth and is inextricably linked to family ties”); In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 
357, 366 (B.I.A. 1996) (“The characteristics of being a ‘young woman’ and a ‘member of the 
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the term when defining membership in a particular social group.
The reasoning put forth in In re Acosta and clarified through the 
Board’s consecutive decisions on the nature of immutability reso-
nates with classic antidiscrimination analysis and its focus on pro-
tecting traits because of their inherent importance to person-
hood.14 In these cases, the Board centered its analysis on 
identifying the applicant’s protected characteristic and on the ex-
tent to which the applicant was the target of systemic discrimina-
tion.
Part II of this Article outlines the development of the Board’s 
social distinction approach, outlining how this framework is in-
compatible with the immutability framework. The social distinction 
approach shifts the focus of analysis away from the nature of the 
protected trait to the size, cohesivity, and distinction of the pro-
posed social group. Adherents of the social distinction framework 
ask if the group is sufficiently distinct and particular for members 
of the larger society to recognize it as a discrete social group. The 
immutability framework, by contrast, identifies which individual-
level characteristics decision-makers should protect from systemic 
discrimination.
In Part III of this Article, the judicial processes through which 
the Board’s social distinction approach became the primary 
framework for adjudicating gender-related asylum claims is out-
lined. By highlighting the practical challenges involved in imple-
menting a framework focused on social distinction, this section 
demonstrates the profoundly negative impact of this approach on 
victims of gender-motivated violence. These individuals come from 
all sectors of society, and thus, the courts would not typically rec-
ognize them as members of a discrete social group.
Part IV of this Article concludes with an argument for why adju-
dicators should reject the social distinction approach and adhere 
to In re Acosta’s immutability framework for determining member-
ship in a particular social group. Although immutability has its lim-
itations, it reflects a fundamental motivation of contemporary asy-
lum law: to protect individuals from systemic discriminatory 
persecution when they are targeted for traits for which they are ei-
ther not at fault or which they should not be required to change.
Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe’ cannot be changed. The characteristic of having intact genitalia 
is one that is so fundamental to the individual identity of a young woman that she should 
not be required to change it.”).
14. In Cece, 733 F.3d at 677, the Seventh Circuit drew a direct analogy between the pro-
tected categories under Title VII and the protected categories of asylum law.
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I. THE IMMUTABILITY FRAMEWORK FOR DEFINING MEMBERSHIP IN A 
PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP
A. The Historical Roots of Immutability
The INA does not define any of the five enumerated categories 
of persecution, but “membership of a particular social group” has 
caused the greatest confusion.15 The phrase “membership of a par-
ticular social group” was first introduced during the Conference of 
Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons 
(1951), which was convened to complete the drafting of the 1951 
U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.16 The confer-
ence debates were the first concentrated effort to create a clear 
definition of the term refugee. During the conference, the Swedish 
representative introduced an amendment to include a reference to 
persons who might be persecuted “because they belonged to par-
ticular social groups.”17 At the time, neither the Swedish repre-
sentative nor any other state representative attempted to define the 
meaning and scope of the proposed category of refugee.18 The legis-
lative history of the Refugee Act sheds little light on the social 
group aspect of the refugee definition.19
The Board first addressed the meaning of the term “member-
ship of a particular social group” in In re Acosta.20 The respondent, 
15. Interview with Judge Paul W. Schmidt, Immigration Judge (Feb. 9, 2017). Judge 
Schmidt explained that prior to 1980, Congress and the courts had never formally defined 
the terms “race,” “religion,” “nationality” and “political opinion,” but their meanings were 
well established within U.S. political culture and garnered wide-political support. Interviews 
with asylum officers and immigration judges suggest that when applying the grounds of 
race, religion, nationality and political opinion, asylum officers and immigration judges 
could more easily rely on institutional scripts which associated refugee status with state-
sponsored persecution of religious and political minorities rooted in Cold War politics. In 
this respect, rather than signaling a sharp break from Cold War refugee policy, the new re-
gime drew from, and to a certain extent preserved, understandings of refugee status formed 
during the Cold War. This was not the case with “membership of a particular social group.”
The category had no clear referent in U.S. political culture and lawmakers perceived the 
term as ambiguous.
16. IVOR JACKSON, THE REFUGEE CONCEPT IN GROUP SITUATIONS 69 (1999).
17. U.N. GAOR, Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and State-
less Persons, 3d mtg. at 14, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.2/SR.3 at 14 (Nov. 19, 1951).
18. Id.
19. See Deborah E. Anker & Michael H. Posner, The Forty Year Crisis: A Legislative History 
of the Refugee Act of 1980, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 9 (1981).
20. In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985). Acosta is one of the most cited 
decisions in asylum law, setting the shape of particular social group jurisprudence not only 
in the United States but in other principle asylum receiving countries. See also Rebecca Ham-
lin, International Law and Administrative Insulation: A Comparison of Refugee Status Determination 
Regimes in the United States, Canada, and Australia, 37 L.& SOC. INQUIRY 933 (2012); Catherine 
Dauvergne & Jenni Millbank, Burdened by Proof: How the Australian Refugee Review Tribunal Has 
Failed Lesbian and Gay Asylum Seekers, 31 FED. L. REV. 299 (2003).
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a native and citizen of El Salvador, was persecuted by guerrillas be-
cause of his refusal to participate in the guerrilla-sponsored work 
stoppages as a taxi driver. The question before the Board was 
whether the respondent’s claimed suffering of persecution based 
on his membership in a group comprised of “COTAXI drivers and 
persons engaged in the transportation industry of El Salvador” was 
cognizable for asylum purposes.21 To answer this question, the 
Board defined the meaning of the term, “membership of a particu-
lar social group.” According to the Board, a “particular social 
group” must first and foremost “preserve the concept that refuge is 
restricted to individuals who are either unable by their own ac-
tions, or as a matter of conscience should not be required, to avoid 
persecution.”22 This ruling emphasized that “dissent or disagree-
ment with the conditions in another country or a desire to experi-
ence greater economic advantage or personal freedom in the 
United States” did not represent sufficient grounds for asylum.23
The Board held that an applicant is “worthy” of asylum if he or 
she is persecuted for an immutable attribute that the applicant cannot 
change or should not be required to change.24 Accordingly, the Board in-
terpreted the phrase “persecution on account of membership of a 
particular social group” to mean:
[P]ersecution that is directed toward an individual who is a 
member of a group of persons all of whom share a com-
mon, immutable characteristic. . . . that either is beyond the 
power of an individual to change or that is so fundamental 
to his identity or conscience that it not be required to be 
changed.25
The Board rationalized its new emphasis on immutability on the 
well-established doctrine of ejusdem generis (of the same kind), stat-
ing that “membership of a particular social group” should be un-
derstood in light of the other four enumerated categories: race, re-
ligion, nationality, and political opinion. These terms, according to 
the Board, all described “persecution aimed at an immutable char-
acteristic.”26
21. Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 232.
22. Id. at 234.
23. Id. at 221–22.
24. See id. at 218, 233.
25. Id. at 233–34.
26. Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). A critical reading of U.S. 
asylum policy suggests, however, that this explanation is partial at best. Analysis of reports of 
international refugee conventions dating back to the interwar period indicates that at the 
time deservingness for asylum was a function of an individual’s political and religious moti-
vation to flee. That is, the focus was not on the immutable nature of the trait prompting the 
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The concept of immutability was not particular to asylum law but 
rather central to U.S. jurisprudence at the time.27 Immutability first 
appeared in the U.S. Supreme Court’s equal protection jurispru-
dence in Frontiero v. Richardson, where a plurality of the Court rea-
soned:
[S]ince sex, like race and national origin, is an immutable
characteristic determined solely by the accident of birth, 
the imposition of special disabilities upon members of a 
particular sex because of their sex would seem to violate 
the basic concept of our system that legal burdens should 
bear some relationship to individual responsibility . . . .28
The logic behind the immutability standard was that certain 
traits—like race, sex, and national origin—are not blameworthy, as 
they represent “accidents of birth.”29 This reflects a shared moral 
intuition that it is unjust to discriminate against an individual be-
cause of a trait that bears no relationship to individual responsibil-
ity.30 The In re Acosta Board did not directly cite the Frontiero deci-
sion, but the language it used was reminiscent of this logic. In 
importing the immutability standard from equal protection juris-
prudence to asylum law, the Board centered eligibility for asylum 
on the nature of the trait for which an individual was persecuted; 
the implicit notion was that only persons who could not avoid per-
secution under any circumstances were eligible for asylum protec-
tion.
persecution of an individual, but on whether the motivation to flee was religious/political—
rather than economic. That the board’s use of the immutability standard signals a new de-
velopment in U.S. asylum law is further indicated by the fact that the board’s definition of 
particular social group in Acosta diverged from prior definitions of the category, all of which 
emphasized shared background, habits, interests, values, and social status, as defining fac-
tors of particular social groups for asylum purposes. See GUY S. GOODWIN-GILL & JANE 
MCADAM, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (3d ed. 2007); ATLE GRAHL-MADSEN, THE 
STATUS OF REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1972).
27. See Jessica A. Clarke, Against Immutability, 125 YALE L. J. 2 (2015). Clarke contends 
that the concept of immutability as chance or ‘an accident of birth’ arose in the Supreme 
Court’s equal protection jurisprudence: “the Supreme Court has mentioned immutability as 
one of several factors that might be relevant to the question of whether a legislative classifi-
cation based on a particular trait deserves heightened scrutiny by the courts.” Id. at 13–14.
28. Id. at 14–15 (quoting Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (plurality 
opinion) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
29. Id. at 9 (internal quotation marks omitted).
30. See id. at 9–10.
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B. The Migration of the Immutability Standard from Equal Protection 
Jurisprudence to Asylum Law: Expanding the Immutability Concept
Once imported from equal protection jurisprudence to asylum 
law, the concept of immutability transformed. In Frontiero v. Rich-
ardson, the Court adopted a literal interpretation of the term and 
restricted immutability to physically unchangeable traits, whose 
“possessors are powerless to escape or set aside.”31 In In re Acosta,
the Board expanded this definition to include characteristics that 
are “so fundamental to individual identity or conscience that
[they] ought not be required to be changed.”32 From this perspec-
tive, decision-makers could only understand immutability in the 
literal sense of the term: traits that members of the class are physi-
cally unable to change or traits that are so fundamental to a per-
son’s identity that it would be unjust for a government to penalize 
a person for refusing to change them—regardless of their physical 
capability to do so.33
In 1985, immutability was still a vague concept in U.S. asylum 
law. Arguing that the “shared characteristic might be an innate one 
such as sex, color, or kinship ties,” the Board held in In re Acosta
that neither the characteristics of being a taxi driver or refusing to 
participate in guerrilla-sponsored work stoppages were immutable 
“because the members of the group could avoid the threats of the 
guerrillas either by changing jobs or by cooperating in work stop-
pages.”34 According to the Board, “because the respondent’s mem-
bership in the group of taxi drivers was something he had the power 
to change, . . . he has not shown that the conduct he feared was per-
secution on account of membership in a particular social group.”35
Following this decision, the Board denied asylum to an increas-
ing number of applicants under the rationale that the claimants 
did not have characteristics or traits that were immutable or fun-
damental to a person’s individual identity or conscience. These in-
31. Id. at 14 (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 360 (1978)) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted); see also Johnson v. Robinson, 415 U.S. 361, 365 (1974) 
(holding that conscientious objectors lacked an immutable characteristic determined solely 
by the accident of birth).
32. In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985). The broadening of immutability 
to include traits that are “fundamental” to individual identity is not unique to asylum. See
Douglas Laycock, Taking Constitutions Seriously: A Theory of Judicial Review, 59 TEX. L. REV. 343 
(1981). As early as 1981, Douglas Laycock argued for a more expansive understanding of 
immutability under the rationale that “some characteristics should be treated as immutable 
because of fundamental interests in not changing them.” Id. at 383.
33. The broadening of immutability to include traits that are fundamental to individual 
identity is not particular to asylum law but is characteristic of antidiscrimination law and 
plays a vital role in employment discrimination disputes. See Clarke, supra note 27, at 8.
34. Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 234.
35. Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted).
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cluded proposed social groups defined by age, living environment, 
socio-economic status, and former professional status.36 During this 
early period, however, it was still unclear what attributes qualified 
as immutable, in ways that warranted asylum protection. Over the 
course of a decade, three traits came to define the meaning of the 
phrase “fundamental to individual identity:” sexual orientation, 
kinship ties, and gender identity.
1. Sexual Orientation as a New Standard for 
Defining Immutability
In the 1990 case of In re Toboso-Alfonso, the Board held that ho-
mosexuality constitutes a trait that is both immutable and funda-
mental to individual identity.37 Fidel Toboso-Alfonso, a forty-year-
old native and citizen of Cuba, applied for asylum and withholding 
of deportation as a member of a particular social group composed 
of homosexuals.38 The applicant claimed that he was a homosexual 
who had experienced persecution on account of that status at the 
hands of the Cuban government. In February 1986, the immigra-
tion judge found Toboso-Alfonso eligible for asylum as a “member 
of a particular social group who fears persecution by the Cuban 
Government.”39 The Immigration and Naturalization Service (here-
inafter “the Service”), however, appealed the judge’s decision on 
the claim that the applicant failed to establish a cognizable particu-
lar social group for asylum.40 On appeal, the Board held that the 
Service did not present “persuasive arguments” on which to reverse 
the immigration judge’s decision.41 Specifically, whereas the Ser-
vice argued that he was harmed on account of specific activities, 
the Board held that “[t]he applicant’s testimony and evidence . . .
do not reflect that it was specific activity that resulted in the gov-
ernmental actions against him in Cuba, it was his having the status 
of being a homosexual.”42 In support of its holding, the Board cit-
36. Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1577 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that the peti-
tioners’ class of young, urban, working class males are not a cognizable social group since 
“[i]ndividuals falling within the parameters of this sweeping demographic division naturally 
manifest a plethora of different lifestyles, varying interests, diverse cultures, and contrary 
political leanings”).
37. In re Fidel Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. 819 (B.I.A. 1990).
38. Id. at 820.
39. Id. The immigration judge denied the applicant’s asylum application due to his 
criminal record in the United States but granted his application for withholding of deporta-
tion to Cuba. Id. at 822.
40. Id. at 820.
41. Id. at 822.
42. Id.
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ed social and behavioral scientists who claimed that sexual orienta-
tion is an immutable characteristic that is highly resistant to 
change and that is fundamental to personhood.43 Although the 
Board rejected Toboso-Alfonso’s application for asylum due to his 
criminal record, it held that homosexuality is an immutable trait 
that can constitute membership in a particular social group.
In 1993, a judge in United States immigration court granted asy-
lum to Marcelo Tenorio from Brazil based on his membership in a 
particular social group defined by same-sex sexual orientation.44
Although immigration judges’ decisions are not precedential, this 
was the first such decision to award asylum by acknowledging that 
homosexuals were members of a particular social group.45 On June 
19, 1994, Attorney General Janet Reno designated the decision in 
In re Toboso-Alfonso as precedent in all proceedings involving the 
same or similar issues.46 Under U.S. asylum law, homosexuality was 
now an innate identity trait that was immutable and definitive to 
personhood. Following the decision, the Ninth Circuit extended 
the In re Toboso-Alfonso ruling to include transgender identity, hold-
ing that female sexual identity is an immutable trait that is funda-
mental to how a person defines his or her sense of self.47
2. Kinship Ties and Female Genital Mutilation as 
Immutable Characteristics
In the summer of 1996, the Board published two precedential
decisions in which it further clarified the meaning of immutability 
for asylum purposes. The first case, known as In re H-,48 involved a 
native of Somalia who was a member of the Darood clan and the 
Marehan sub-clan, who claimed to have experienced persecution 
43. Id. The Board, however, did not grant asylum to Toboso-Alfonso due to a criminal 
conviction for drug possession. Id. at 822.
44. In re Tenorio, No. A72-093-558 (B.I.A. 1999), reprinted in REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY
713 (Karen Musalo et al. eds., 1997); see Alan G. Bennett, The Cure that Harms: Sexual Orienta-
tion-Based Asylum and the Changing Definition of Persecution, 29 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 279
(1999).
45. Bennett, supra note 44, at 287.
46. In re Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. 819 (B.I.A. 1990). The designation of the orig-
inal case, decided in 1990, as precedent in 1994, paved the way for asylum based on sexual 
orientation. See Stefan Vogler, Legally Queer: The Construction of Sexuality in LGBQ Asylum 
Claims, 50 LAW & SOC’Y REV., 862 (2016).
47. Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1085, 1094 (9th Cir. 2000) (concluding 
that the Board erred in defining the particular social group as “homosexual males who dress 
as females” holding that correct definition is “gay men with female sexual identities;” ac-
cording to the court, female sexual identity is an immutable trait that is fundamental to a 
person’s individual identity). See Stefan Vogler, Legally Queer: The Construction of Sexuality in 
LGBQ Asylum Claims, 50 L. & SOC’Y REV. 4, 862 (2016).
48. In re H-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 337 (B.I.A. 1996).
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on account of his clan-membership.49 In December of 1990, there 
was an uprising against the Marehan sub-clan. Members of the op-
position United Somali Congress murdered the applicant’s father 
and brother, while they detained and severely beat him. The appli-
cant succeeded escaping to Kenya, after his maternal uncle (a 
member of the United Somali Congress), recognized him and as-
sisted in his escape.50
The immigration judge initially denied the applicant’s request 
for asylum on the conclusion that “[a] person is not entitled to po-
litical asylum in the United States because of clan warfare or be-
cause of civil warfare.”51 The question before the Board was wheth-
er “family membership in the Marehan subclan” constitutes a 
particular social group.52 To answer this question, the Board ana-
lyzed the nature of clan membership as a personal trait. Citing The 
Immigration and Naturalization Service Basic Law Manual on asylum
adjudications, the Board concluded that clan membership is “ac-
quired at birth and is inextricably linked to family ties.”53 Accord-
ing to the Board, because the applicant could not disassociate him-
self from the clan (clan membership is acquired at birth) nor
should he be required to (tribal membership is a definitive aspect 
of Somalian culture and identity), clan membership constituted an 
immutable characteristic and the basis of a particular social group 
cognizable for asylum purposes.54 Significantly, the Board proceed-
ed to clarify that the size of the group is irrelevant to a determina-
tion of whether the proposed group is cognizable: “[t]he fact that 
almost all Somalis can claim clan membership and that interclan 
conflict is prevalent should not create undue concern . . . .”55 Ra-
ther, the relevant criterion for determining membership in a par-
ticular social group is the immutability of the trait for which an indi-
vidual suffers persecution. Citing “considerable evidence” that the 
applicant was indeed injured on account of his membership in the 
Darood clan and the Marehan sub-clan, the Board held that 
“members of the Marehan sub-clan of Somalia, which share kin-
ship ties and linguistic commonalities,” constituted a particular so-
cial group for asylum purposes.
No more than two weeks after publishing In re H-, the Board 
rendered a second precedential decision, known as In re Kasinga.
In this case, the Board concluded that the subordinate gender sta-
49. Id. at 340.
50. Id. at 340–41.
51. Id. at 338.
52. Id. at 342.
53. Id.
54. See id. at 342–43.
55. See id. at 343–44.
580 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [Vol. 53:3
tus and sexuality of victims of female genital mutilation (FGM) 
make them targets constituting a particular social group. Kasinga 
was a nineteen-year-old native and citizen of Togo, who fled co-
erced female genital cutting and forced marriage. The immigra-
tion judge denied Kasinga’s claim on the ground that she was not 
credible, and that female genital cutting is part of a tribal culture 
and does not constitute persecution under asylum law.56 On ap-
peal, the Board reversed the immigration judge’s verdict in a near-
ly unanimous decision. The Board stated that FGM is a form of 
persecution “used to control woman’s (sic) sexuality,” and a form 
of “sexual oppression” that is “based on the manipulation of wom-
en’s sexuality in order to assure male dominance and exploita-
tion.”57 The Board cited Nahid Toubia, an advisor to the World 
Health Organization and director of the Global Action Against 
FGM Project at Columbia University School of Health, who estab-
lished that FGM was not merely a cultural practice, but rather a 
form of oppression aimed at violating and exploiting a woman’s 
sexuality.58 The Board added that “FGM, is practiced, at least in 
some significant part, to overcome sexual characteristics of young 
women of the tribe [intact genitalia] who have not been, and do 
not wish to be, subjected to FGM.” 59 Holding that the “characteris-
tic of having intact genitalia is so fundamental to the individual 
identity of a young woman that she should not be required to 
change it,”60 the Board concluded that FGM is a form of persecu-
tion inflicted on a shared immutable characteristic—female sexual-
ity—and therefore constituted the basis of a particular social 
group.61
The reasoning put forth in In re Acosta and clarified through the 
Board’s three consecutive decisions on the nature of immutability 
resonates with classic antidiscrimination analysis. In these cases, 
56. In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 358–59 (B.I.A 1996). Kasinga’s case caught the 
attention of Karen Musalo, the acting head of the Human Rights Clinic at American Univer-
sity, who agreed to handle the appeal pro bono. Shortly after becoming involved in the case, 
Musalo turned to various human rights and feminist organizations. Among them was Surita 
Sandosham, the executive director of Equality Now, a women’s rights organization and a 
leading player in the emerging global anti-FGM campaign. In the following months, there 
was a steady progression of incredibly positive media in favor of Kasinga, who was portrayed 
as a victim of a horrific practice aimed at subordinating women. See David Martin, Adelaide 
Abankwah, Fauziya Kasinga, and the Dilemmas of Political Asylum, in IMMIGRATION STORIES 243 
(David A. Martin & Peter H. Schuck eds., 2005).
57. Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 366.
58. Id. at 361. Through its focus is on female genital cutting, the Board generated an 
understanding of immutability associated with bodily (sexual) traits framed as innate and 
fundamental to individual personhood. See id. at 366.
59. Id. at 367.
60. Id. at 366.
61. Id. at 367.
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the Board focused on identifying the protected characteristic and 
the extent to which it was the target of systemic discrimination. 
Foreign courts have further elaborated on the analogy between the 
protected categories of asylum law and the protected categories 
under antidiscrimination law. In Ward v. Attorney General of Canada,
the Supreme Court of Canada held that the principle stated in the 
Preamble of the Refugee Convention should serve as the guiding 
criteria for which cases are embraced by the Convention: “In distil-
ling the contents of the head of ‘particular social group’, [sic] ac-
count should be taken of the general underlying themes of the de-
fence of human rights and anti-discrimination that form the basis 
for the international refugee protection initiative.”62 New Zealand 
and the United Kingdom have also adopted the In re Acosta “pro-
tected characteristic” approach to define a particular social group; 
both courts have argued that the protected characteristic defining 
a cognizable particular social group is intrinsically linked to the 
principle of discrimination.63 In the United States, an alternative 
approach to defining particular social groups for asylum purposes 
began to emerge, which focused not on identifying what traits re-
quired protection from systemic discrimination, but rather, on 
whether the particular group represented a recognized subdivision 
within the asylum applicant’s society. The Board rationalized its 
social distinction requirement as “the need to put ‘outer limits’ on 
the definition of a ‘particular social group.’”64
II. THE SOCIAL DISTINCTION FRAMEWORK FOR DEFINING 
MEMBERSHIP IN A PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP
Soon after the Acosta decision, the Ninth Circuit provided an al-
ternative definition of a particular social group.65 In Sanchez-Trujillo 
v. INS, the petitioners—Luis Alonzo Sanchez-Trujillo and Luis Ar-
mando Escobar-Nieto, natives and citizens of El Salvador—applied 
for asylum based on their membership in a purportedly persecuted 
62. Canada (A.G.) v. Ward, 1993, 2 S.C.R. 689, 692 (1993); see Marouf, supra note 7, at 
54.
63. The New Zealand Refugee Status Appeals Authority specifically found that the 
Acosta interpretation of a “particular social group” connects this social category to “the prin-
ciple of the avoidance of civil and political discrimination.” Marouf, supra note 7, at 56. In 
the United Kingdom, the leading case on membership in a particular social group is the 
House of Lords’ decision on Islam, which also relied heavily on Acosta. “Lord Hoffman rea-
soned that the Convention ‘is concerned not with all cases of persecution, even if they in-
volve denials of human rights, but with persecution which is based on discrimination.’” See 
id.
64. In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 238 (B.I.A. 2014).
65. Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1576–77 (9th Cir. 1986).
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social group of “young, working-class males who have not served in 
the military of El Salvador.”66 In a decision rendered in September 
1982, the immigration judge found that such a large division of the 
population did not constitute a cognizable “social group.”67 The 
Board affirmed the immigration judge’s findings, holding, “[the] 
status of a young, urban, working class male without military ser-
vice” did not constitute membership in a particular social group. 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the Board’s finding that the 
class of people that the petitioners identified did not represent a 
cognizable social group, emphasizing, “the statutory words ‘partic-
ular’ and ‘social’ which modify ‘group’ . . . indicate that the term 
does not encompass every broadly defined segment of a popula-
tion, even if a certain demographic division does have some statis-
tical relevance.”68 According to the court, “[o]f central concern [to 
the formation of a cognizable social group] is the existence of a 
voluntary associational relationship among the purported mem-
bers, which imparts some common characteristic that is fundamen-
tal to their identity as a member of that discrete social group.”69
The court never cited Acosta’s immutability standard, instead 
centering its analysis on the “particularity” of the group, the extent 
to which it is “cohesive” and “homogenous.” The court made the 
term “homogenous” the primary criterion for determining wheth-
er a proposed social group was cognizable for asylum purposes.70
According to the court, “such an all-encompassing grouping as the 
petitioners identify simply is not that type of cohesive, homogene-
ous group to which we believe the term ‘particular social group’ 
was intended to apply.”71 In what would become a recurring theme 
in social group jurisprudence, the court referred to the “fear of 
floodgates” argument to justify its emphasis on the group’s cohesiv-
ity and particularity, claiming that “[t]o hold otherwise would be 
tantamount to extending refugee status to every alien displaced by 
general conditions of unrest or violence in his or her home coun-
66. Id. at 1572.
67. Id. at 1573.
68. Id. at 1576. The court cited the Ninth Circuit decisions that rejected similar formu-
lations on the ground that these are too broad; see, e.g., Chavez v. INS, 723 F.2d 1431, 1434 
(9th Cir. 1984) (holding that the alien’s “status as a ‘young urban male’ is not specific 
enough for asylum”).
69. Sanchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2d at 1576.
70. Id. at 1577.
71. No other court adopted the Ninth Circuit’s “voluntary associational requirement.”
The Ninth Circuit eventually remanded the Sanchez-Trujillo decision to clarify that voluntary 
associational relationship is not a qualifying criterion for defining particular social group. 
See Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1092 (9th Cir. 2000).
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try.”72 According to the court, “[r]efugee status simply does not ex-
tend as far as the petitioners would contend.”73
In a 1991 case, Gomez v. Immigration and Naturalization Service,74
the Second Circuit held that the salient definition of a particular 
social group was a group that consists of “individuals who possess 
some fundamental characteristic in common which serves to dis-
tinguish them in the eyes of a persecutor—or in the eyes of the 
outside world in general.”75 In complete contradiction of the im-
mutability centered framework for social group put forth in Acosta,
the court concluded that “[p]ossession of broadly-based character-
istics such as youth and gender will not by itself endow individuals 
with membership in a particular group.”76 Over the course of the 
next decade, this focus on particularity and social perceivability 
became the basis for a new approach to defining a “particular so-
cial group,” which emphasized not the shared (immutable) identi-
ty traits that make one the target of systemic discrimination, but ra-
ther, the social distinction and particularity of the group’s outer 
limits.
The first time the Board shifted the focus of its analysis away 
from the immutability standard and toward the social cognizability 
of the proposed social group was in the landmark case, In re R-A-.77
The respondent in the case, Rodi Alvarado, a native and citizen of 
Guatemala, suffered brutal physical and sexual violence at the 
hands of her husband, a former soldier in the Guatemalan army. 
After repeated failed attempts to obtain government protection, 
she fled to the United States in search of asylum. The immigration 
judge found the respondent to be credible and concluded that she 
suffered persecution on account of her membership in the particu-
lar social group of “Guatemalan women who have been involved 
intimately with Guatemalan male companions, who believe that 
women are to live under male domination.”78 Importantly, the im-
migration judge held that members of such a group are subordi-
nated and targeted for persecution on account of their gender by 
the men who seek to dominate and control them.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 550 (2d Cir. 1991); see also Ananeh-Firempong v. INS, 766 
F.2d 621, 626 (1st Cir. 1985) (adopting the United Nations High Commissioner for Refu-
gees interpretation that “a ‘particular social group’ normally comprises persons of similar 
background, habits or social status . . . .”).
75. Gomez, 947 F.2d at 664.
76. Id. (emphasis added).
77. In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (B.I.A. 1999).
78. Id. at 911.
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The Service appealed the immigration judge’s decision, claim-
ing that the applicant’s proposed group was not cognizable for asy-
lum purposes. On appeal, the Board held that the immigration 
judge was wrong to conclude that Alvarado was harmed on account 
of her membership in a particular social group.79 The Board based 
its conclusion on the fact that “[a]bsent from [the] group’s 
makeup [was] a ‘voluntary associational relationship’ that [was] of 
central concern [to] the Ninth Circuit.”80 The Board then clarified, 
“regardless of Ninth Circuit law . . . [the respondent’s claimed so-
cial group fails under its own] independent assessment of what 
constitutes a qualifying social group.”81 According to the Board, the 
proposed social group:
[A]ppears to have been defined principally, if not exclu-
sively, for purposes of this asylum case, and without regard 
to the question of whether anyone in Guatemala perceives 
this group to exist in any form whatsoever. . . . [The group] 
seems to bear little or no relation to the way in which Gua-
temalans might identify subdivisions within their own socie-
ty . . . .82
Although the Board noted, “[t]he proposed group may satisfy the 
basic requirement of containing an immutable or fundamental in-
dividual characteristic,” the Board did not address the question of 
whether members of the proposed group are targets of systematic 
discrimination.83 Instead, the Board spent the crux of its analysis 
explaining that “for the group to be viable for asylum purposes, we 
believe there must also be some showing of how the characteristic 
is understood in the alien’s society . . . .”84 According to the Board, 
because the respondent in this case had failed to show that “Gua-
temalan women who have been involved intimately with Guatema-
lan male companions, who believe that women are to live under 
male domination is a group that is recognized and understood to 
79. Alvarado also made a claim of imputed political opinion. The Board rejected this 
argument, stating that, “the respondent has failed to show that her husband was motivated 
to harm her, even in part, because of her membership in a particular social group or be-
cause of an actual or imputed political opinion.” See id. at 907.
80. Id. at 917–18 (quoting Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1572 (9th Cir. 1986)
(rejecting the proposed social group of “young, working class males who have not served in 
the military of El Salvador”)).
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be a societal faction,” she failed to establish her membership with-
in a cognizable particular social group.85
In a 2006 case, In re C-A-, the Board formally introduced changes 
to its original immutability framework for the first time, turning 
social visibility into an official criterion for defining membership in 
a particular social group for asylum purposes.86 The case involved a 
married couple and their two minor children, all natives and citi-
zens of Colombia, who claimed persecution on account of their 
membership in the group of “noncriminal drug informants work-
ing against the Cali drug cartel.”87 After clarifying that it would 
continue to adhere to the In re Acosta formulation of a particular 
social group, the Board added a second “relevant factor” in con-
sidering whether a given particular social group was cognizable: 
“the extent to which members of a society perceive those with the 
characteristic in question as members of a social group.”88 Address-
ing the respondents’ proposed group, the Board held that “non-
criminal drug informants working against the Cali cartel” in Co-
lombia did not constitute a particular social group for asylum pur-
purposes because of “the lack of social visibility of the members of 
the purported social group, and the indications in the record that 
the Cali cartel retaliates against anyone perceived to have inter-
fered with its operations . . . .”89 Moreover, for a group to be cog-
nizable by members of the given society, the Board explained, it 
cannot be “too loosely defined to meet the requirement of particu-
larity” as in the case of noncriminal informants who come from all 
sectors of society.90
Several months after C-A-, the Board rendered a decision in a 
case known as In re A-M-E & J-G-U.91 The Board not only affirmed 
the importance of social visibility, but also formally added the cri-
terion of “particularity.”92 In this case, the question before the 
Board was whether “affluent Guatemalans” constitute a cognizable 
particular social group for asylum purposes. The respondents in 
the case, a married couple from Guatemala, claimed to have re-
ceived repeated threats against their life. As a result, they had to 
continually change their location because of their membership in 
a particular social group composed of “higher socio-economic” 
Guatemalans. The Board first noted that the determination of 
85. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
86. In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951 (B.I.A. 2006).
87. Id. at 951, 957.
88. Id. at 957.
89. Id. at 961.
90. Id. at 957.
91. In re A-M-E & J-G-U-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69 (B.I.A. 2007).
92. Id. at 69, 74–76.
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“wealth” was not “immutable,” though it did not disqualify the
proposed group if “the shared characteristic is so fundamental to 
identity or conscience that it should not be expected to be 
changed.”93 The Board, however, chose not to reach a decision on 
whether wealth constitutes a trait fundamental to individual identi-
ty, holding that the group failed on another ground: it was not suf-
ficiently “identifiable” to meet the requirements of a particular so-
cial group within the meaning of the refugee definition.94 Center-
Centering its analysis on the issue of “social visibility,” the Board 
stated that there was little evidence in the case to indicate that 
“wealthy Guatemalans would be recognized as a group that is at 
greater risk of crime in general or of extortion or robbery in par-
ticular.”95 According to the Board, the terms “wealth” and “afflu-
ent” were too amorphous; the proposed group of “wealthy” Gua-
temalans was not “sufficiently defined as to meet the requirements 
of a particular [and socially visible] social group within the meaning 
of the refugee definition.”96
A year later, the Board further refined its particularity and social 
visibility requirements in a pair of rulings involving gang-related vi-
olence.97 Here, the Board explained that the “essence of the ‘par-
ticularity’ requirement is whether the proposed group can accu-
rately be described in a manner sufficiently distinct such that the 
group would be recognized in the society in question as a discrete 
class of persons.” Social visibility refers to a characteristic that could 
be recognizable by others in the community.98 The Board noted 
93. Id. at 73.
94. Id. at 74.
95. Id.
96. See id.
97. In re S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579 (B.I.A. 2008); In re E-A-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 591 
(B.I.A. 2008). In S-E-G-, the Board rejected the social groups of “Salvadoran youth who have 
been subjected to recruitment efforts by MS-13 and who have rejected or resisted member-
ship in the gang based on their own personal, moral, and religious opposition to the gang’s
values and activities,” as well as “family members of such Salvadoran youth,” holding that 
these formulations do not satisfy the standards of “particularity” and “visibility.” S-E-G-, 24 I. 
& N. Dec. at 581, 587, 590. Although the Board conceded that the respondents were victims 
of harassment, beatings and threats from a criminal gang in El Salvador, it held that, 
“[t]here is little in the background evidence of [the] record to indicate that Salvadorian 
youth who are recruited by gangs but refuse to join (or their family members) would be 
‘perceived as a group’ by society, or that these individuals suffer from a higher incidence of 
crime than the rest of the population.” S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 587. In re E-A-G-involved a 
native and citizen of Honduras who claimed asylum on account of his membership in the 
particular social group of “young persons who are perceived to be affiliated with gangs” and 
“persons resistant to gang membership.” E-A-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 593. Also, the Board failed 
to conduct any analysis of the immutability of the protected trait, focusing instead on the 
group’s social visibility and particularity. See id. According to the Board, “[p]ersons who re-
sist joining gangs have not been shown to be part of a socially visible group within Hondu-
ran society . . . or that individuals who are part of that body of persons are seen as a segment 
of the population in any meaningful respect.” Id. at 594–95.
98. S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 586–88.
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that although size may represent an important factor in determin-
ing whether a group was recognizable, the key factor was whether 
“the proposed description is sufficiently ‘particular,’ or is ‘too 
amorphous . . . to create a benchmark for determining group 
membership.’”99 Turning to the facts of the particular case, the 
Board held that the respondents’ groups “make up a potentially 
large and diffuse segment of society,” and thus, lacked sufficient 
particularity and visibility.100 Accordingly, “the motivation of gang 
members in recruiting and targeting young males” may have had 
no relationship to the fact that “the males in question were mem-
bers of a class.”101 In both decisions, the Board deliberately avoided 
engaging in an analysis of the group’s immutability, and instead 
centered its analysis on the question of whether or not members of 
the claimants’ society could sufficiently perceive the groups as dis-
tinct from the broader population.
In response to critiques from the circuit courts concerning the 
lack of clarity of the new “social visibility” and “particularity” re-
quirements, the Board renamed the “social visibility” standard as 
“social distinction,” to clarify that the standard did not refer to lit-
eral or “ocular” visibility, but rather to whether the society in ques-
tion could recognize the particular social group as a distinct enti-
ty.102 According to the Board, an In re Acosta-only test would cause 
considerable confusion and lack of consistency that would “virtual-
ly swallow the entire refugee definition if common characteristics, 
coupled with a meaningful level of harm, were all that need be 
shown.”103 In these consecutive decisions issued over a period of 
almost a decade, the Board essentially abandoned the immutability 
framework in favor of one centered on “social cognizability.” The 
emphasis was no longer on the immutable protected characteristic 
that was the target of systemic discrimination, but rather on the 
particularity and delineation of the group’s outer boundaries.
This reading of social group case law highlights the two compet-
ing frameworks for adjudicating social group claims: one focused 
on immutability and the other on social distinction. Although the 
Board maintains that these frameworks are compatible with one 
another, this study has revealed how the two frameworks contradict 
one another. Each centers the analysis on a fundamentally distinct 
set of questions and concerns. The immutability framework, set 
99. Id. at 584.
100. Id. at 585.
101. Id.
102. In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 227 (B.I.A. 2014); see also In re W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. 
Dec. 208 (B.I.A. 2014).
103. M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. at 231.
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forth in the Board’s landmark Acosta decision, focuses on discern-
ing which individual-level characteristics should be protected from 
systemic discrimination. In this framework, the concern is with 
what constitutes an “immutable” identity-based trait and the extent 
to which this trait is the target of discriminatory persecution. From 
this perspective, the scope of the social group is irrelevant; 
regardless of how broad the category may be, the individual appli-
cants still must establish that their persecution was the result of 
their protected characteristic.104 Conversely, the social distinction 
framework concentrates on the discernibility of the proposed 
group’s outer-limits. The focus is not on what individual-level trait 
deserves state protection from systemic discriminatory persecution 
but what groups members of a given society recognize according to 
the traditional segments and subdivisions of that culture. The 
group’s particularity, visibility, and cohesiveness replace the ques-
tion of the immutability of individual-level traits. The following sec-
tion includes an examination of how this emphasis on social dis-
tinction became the Board’s primary framework for analyzing 
claims of gender-motivated violence. Given that the Board has con-
sistently refused to recognize gender alone as constitutive of a par-
ticular social group, instead combining it with other qualifying 
characteristics, such an analysis is necessary.
III. APPLYING THE SOCIAL DISTINCTION FRAMEWORK TO 
GENDER-RELATED ASYLUM CLAIMS
A. Combining Gender with Qualifying Characteristics
In In re Acosta, the Board explicitly stated that sex is an “immuta-
ble characteristic” that may constitute the basis of a particular so-
cial group. Foreign courts, adhering to the In re Acosta immutability 
standard, have recognized social groups defined solely by gen-
104. In Cece v. Holder, 733 F.3d 662, 673–74 (7th Cir. 2013), the court drew a direct anal-
ogy between social group analysis for asylum purposes and Title VII, holding that: “the 
breadth of the social group says nothing about the requirements for asylum, just as the 
breadth of categories under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act says nothing about who is eligi-
ble to sue an employer for discrimination. All African Americans and all women, for exam-
ple, are members of ‘protected’ categories under Title VII, but not all African Americans 
and women have a claim for discrimination. In order to be entitled to asylum, Cece must be 
able to demonstrate a particular link between her mistreatment and her membership in the 
stated social group.” According to the court, “[i]t would be antithetical to asylum law to de-
ny refuge to a group of persecuted individuals who have valid claims merely because too 
many have valid claims.” Id. at 675.
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der.105 The United Nation’s High Commissioner for Refugees’ 
guidelines on gender similarly state that gender may establish 
membership in a particular social group.106 The guidelines specifi-
cally instruct that, “sex can properly be within the ambit of the so-
cial group category, with women being a clear example of a social subset 
defined by innate and immutable characteristics.”107 In the United States, 
however, decision-makers have been more reluctant to recognize 
gender alone as a characteristic of group membership.108 To date, 
the Board has never defined a particular social group for asylum 
purposes by solely by gender. In re Kasinga was the first case in 
which the Board held that victims of a gender-motivated harms 
(i.e., FGM) are eligible for asylum. However, rather than defining 
Kasinga’s group by gender alone, the Board combined gender with 
other qualifying characteristics like age, nationality, and opposition 
to the practice of FGM. Immigration judges, influenced by the 
Kasinga decision, mirrored this formulation when adjudicating 
claims involving gender-based violence.109 Although some circuit 
courts have accepted broad formulations of social groups defined 
by gender,110 the Board has consistently defined particular social 
groups narrowly, centering its analysis on the characteristics of the 
proposed group (i.e., is the group sufficiently distinct and particu-
lar) as opposed to whether there is evidence of systemic discrimi-
105. Islam v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, 2 ALL E.R. 546 (1999); Minister for 
Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v. Khawar, 76 A.L.G.R. 667 (2002); Refugee Appeal No. 
71427/99 (1999); see Karen Musalo, Revisiting Social Group and Nexus in Gender Asylum Claims: 
A Unifying Rationale for Evolving Jurisprudence, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 777 (2003).
106. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees (UNHCR), Guidelines on International Protection No. 
1: Gender-Related Persecution Within the Context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or Its 
1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, U. N. Doc. HCR/GIP/02/01 (2002).
107. Id. at 8 (emphasis added).
108. But see Fatin v. I.N.S., 12 F.3d 1233 (3d Cir. 1993) (accepting the Board of Immigra-
tion Appeal’s conclusion that sex might be a shared characteristic for asylum purposes). See 
also Perdomo v. Holder, 611 F.3d 662 (9th Cir. 2010) (suggesting that Guatemalan women 
might constitute a particular social group). Since the early 1990s, legal scholars increasingly 
called for adjudicating gender-related claims as a form of persecution inflicted on account 
of a woman’s immutable gender, and the number of law journal articles on the topic of 
gender asylum proliferated. See, e.g., Deborah E. Anker, Woman Refugees: Forgotten No Longer,
32 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 771 (1995); Karen Bower, Recognizing Violence Against Women as Persecu-
tion on the Basis of Membership in a Particular Social Group, 7 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 173 (1993); 
Charlotte Bunch, Women’s Rights as Human Rights: Toward a Re-Vision of Human Rights, 12 
HUM. RTS. Q. 486 (1990); Nancy Kelly, Gender-Related Persecution: Assessing the Asylum Claims of 
Women, 26 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 625 (1993); E. Dana Neacsu, Gender-Based Persecution as a Basis 
for Asylum: An Annotated Bibliography, 1993-2002, 95 LAW LIBR. J. 191 (2003).
109. See Lisa Frydman, Recent Developments in Domestic-Violence-Based Asylum Claims, 2009 
LEXISNEXIS EMERGING ISSUES ANALYSIS 4075, 4–5 (2009).
110. See, e.g., Fatin, 12 F.3d 1233; Cece v. Holder, 733 F.3d 662 (7th Cir. 2013); Perdomo,
611 F.3d 662.
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nation against the group.111 This, in turn, poses various challenges 
to victims of gender-motivated harms.
B. Challenges to Women’s Claims
1. The Difficulty of Assessing Societal Perceptions
In In re M-E-V-G-, the Board clarified that applicants for asylum-
seeking relief had to demonstrate “that the group is (1) composed 
of members who share a common immutable characteristic, (2) 
defined with particularity, and (3) socially distinct within the socie-
ty in question.”112 The Board further clarified this to mean that 
members of a particular social group will generally understand 
their own affiliation with that group, as will other people in their 
country.113 Studies in psychology and sociology have documented 
that social perceptions are subjective; the ways that individuals cat-
egorize and perceive of groups vary greatly along lines of race, 
gender, and class—influenced by stereotypes, professional back-
ground, and culture.114 Given that there are multiple and varied 
social perceptions, the Board’s requirement that a given society 
will recognize the applicant’s social group as particular and social 
distinct is highly problematic, leaving decision-makers with consid-
erable discretion to decide what members of a society determine 
the existence of a particular social group.
The Board has also neglected to outline the criteria for deter-
mining social distinction. In In re A-R-C-G-, the Board reasoned that 
the laws of a given society may indicate whether the proposed so-
cial group is socially distinct. According to the Board, “evidence 
111. For the first time in 1993, the Third Circuit Court drew on this framing of gender 
persecution. The case, Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1241, involved a native and citizen of Iran who 
claimed that she feared persecution on account of her membership in the social group of 
Iranian women who find their country’s gender-specific laws offensive and do not wish to 
comply with them. The court, citing In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 234 (B.I.A. 1985), reaf-
firmed that sex is an innate characteristic that could link members of a particular social 
group, but nonetheless denied the case on the ground that Fatin’s opposition to Iranian 
laws, including the requirement that all women wear the traditional veil, did not amount to 
persecution. Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1241. Although Fatin did not receive asylum, this was the first 
time a federal court recognized gender as a basis for a particular social group for asylum 
purposes.
112. In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 251–52 (B.I.A. 2014).
113. See id. at 240.
114. See, e.g., Elizabeth Bruch & Fred Feinberg, Decision-Making Processes in Social Contexts,
43 ANN. REV. SOC. 207, 207–27 (2017); Marouf, supra note 7; Sara L. McKinnon, GENDERED 
ASYLUM: RACE AND VIOLENCE IN US LAW AND POLITICS (2016); Paloma E. Villegas, Moments of 
Humiliation, Intimidation and Implied ‘Illegality’: Encounters with Immigration Officials at the Bor-
der and the Performance of Sovereignty, 41 J. ETHNIC & MIGRATION STUD. 2357, 2357–75 (2015).
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showing that society in general perceives, considers, or recognizes 
persons sharing the particular characteristic to be a group . . .
would include whether the society in question recognizes the need 
to offer protection to victims of domestic violence, including 
whether the country has criminal laws designed to protect domes-
tic abuse victims, whether those laws are effectively enforced, and 
other sociopolitical factors.”115 Citing evidence that Guatemala has 
a culture of “machismo and family violence” and laws in place to 
prosecute domestic violence crimes, the Board concluded that the 
proposed social group of “married women in Guatemala who are 
unable to leave their relationship” is socially distinct within Gua-
temalan society.116
Shortly after the Board published its In re A-R-C-G- decision, At-
torney General Sessions rejected this analysis in In re A-B-. Sessions 
noted that the In re A-R-C-G- Board “provided no explanation for 
why it believed that this evidence [i.e., laws designed to protect vic-
tims of domestic violence] established that Guatemalan society 
perceives, considers, or recognizes ‘married women in Guatemala 
who are unable to leave their relationship’ to be a distinct social 
group.” Yet, he similarly failed to outline the factors for determin-
ing social distinction. Despite identifying that membership in a 
particular clan or tribe is “an instructive example” of a socially dis-
tinct group, the Attorney General provided no explanation for why 
“married women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their rela-
tionship” failed to constitute a cognizable social group for asylum 
purposes.117 Attorney General Session’s closest explanation was, 
“there is significant room for doubt that Guatemalan society views 
these women, as horrible as their personal circumstances may be, 
as members of a distinct group in society, rather than each as a vic-
tim of a particular abuser in highly individualized circumstanc-
es.”118 Attorney General Sessions, however, explained neither the 
basis for this assertion nor whom he was referring to by “Guatema-
lan society.”
2. The Applicability of Narrow Particular Social Groups
A second challenge posed by the formation of narrow and fact-
specific social groups is the confusion generated over these groups’ 
115. In re A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 393–94 (B.I.A. 2014) (citing In re W-G-R-, 26 I. & 
N. Dec. 208, 217 (B.I.A. 2014)).
116. Id. at 392, 394.
117. In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 319, 336 (A.G. 2018).
118. Id. at 336.
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broader applicability. In the period following In re A-R-C-G-, deci-
sion-makers diverged greatly in their interpretations of the broader 
applicability of the Board’s ruling that “married women in Guate-
mala who are unable to leave their relationship” constituted a par-
ticular social group cognizable for asylum purposes. This has led to 
considerable confusion and disparate decisions on cases involving 
similar fact patterns.119 In some cases, immigration judges have in-
terpreted the protection granted in In re A-R-C-G- to encompass 
women who never formally married their abusers. From this per-
spective, the analysis should not center on formal marriage, but ra-
ther, on whether the victim is in a long-term relationship from 
which she cannot escape.120 In other cases, immigration judges 
have interpreted In re A-R-C-G- as applying only to formal marriage, 
and have accordingly rejected claims involving long-standing rela-
tionships between the women and their abusers even when they 
presented themselves as husband and wife in the community.121
Similar issues arise in terms of determining the victim’s ability to 
leave the relationship. In In re A-R-C-G-, the Board asserted that a 
determination of whether a woman is able to leave her relationship 
is a “fact-specific inquiry,” but provided little guidance on the crite-
ria needed to make this determination. In turn, decision-makers 
have rendered disparate decisions in cases involving quite similar 
fact patterns.122 Finally, courts conflict over the broader applicabil-
ity of In re A-R-C-G- to forms of gender-motivated violence aside 
from domestic violence. In In re A-R-C-G-, the Board explicitly cited 
evidence that “sexual offenses against women [are] a serious socie-
tal problem in Guatemala,” but did not clarify if this meant that 
victims of gender-motivated violence—outside of domestic vio-
lence—may also qualify for asylum as members of particular social 
groups.123 Confusion over the broader applicability of the proposed 
groupings has not only led to inconsistencies in court decisions, 
but it has also shifted the focus away from creating a guiding prin-
ciple of asylum, designed to protect victims who are targets of sys-
119. See Bookey, supra note 3.
120. Id. at 13. In a DHS brief, the government officially stated that women in “domestic 
relationships” other than marriage could proffer viable social groups. Dep’t of Homeland 
Security’s Supplemental Brief at 18 n.12, Matter of L-R- (B.I.A. Apr. 13, 2009), 
http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/sites/default/files/Matter_of_LR_DHS_Brief_4_13_ 2009.pdf.
121. See Bookey, supra note 3, at 15.
122. Id. at 15. Some judges determined that if an applicant has successfully divorced her 
husband, she was able to leave the relationship (regardless of whether or not the husband 
continues to stalk her) whereas other judges focus more on whether the abuser sees the di-
vorce or separation as terminating his right to abuse his wife or partner. Bookey, Gender-
Based Asylum Post-Matter of A-R-C-G-, supra note 3, at 15.
123. In re A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 393 (B.I.A. 2014).
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temic discriminatory persecution on account of traits that they can 
neither change nor should be required to change.124
3. Reaffirming the Public/Private Distinction
The Board’s adherence to the social distinction framework rei-
fies an outdated and problematic distinction between “public” and 
“private” forms of harm. Feminist scholars have long criticized the 
definition of a refugee for systematically privileging male-dominated 
public activities above those of women, which largely take place in 
spaces traditionally considered “private.”125 Courts often consider 
forms of gender-related violence as falling within the private (as 
opposed to the public) realm: they are committed by non-
government actors against women from all sectors of society. Ac-
cordingly, courts do not recognize women who experience gender-
motivated harms as members of conventional minority groups 
(typically defined by race, religion and class); instead, they are vic-
tims of generalized violence and private criminal acts.126 Despite 
considerable evidence that the dynamics of domestic violence of-
ten involve more than personal disputes and animosity, decision-
makers have overlooked how such violence stems from culturally-
normed practices that sanction women’s gender-subordinated sta-
tus.127 By focusing on how members of a given society perceive par-
ticular groups, decision-makers have privileged and reified tradi-
tional societal sub-divisions organized along the lines of race, 
religion, and class. Women and victims of generalized forms of vio-
124. In Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611, 615 (7th Cir. 2009), the court held that the 
Board’s implementation and justification of the “social visibility” standard is inconsistent. 
The court reasoned that many of the previous PSG’s accepted by the BIA would fail to meet 
the standard of “social visibility,” such as “former employees of the Colombian attorney gen-
eral,” as they either were or could be unknown to their society as a whole. Id. Claiming the 
Board was thus offering two lines of decision making, the court accused the Board of “refus-
ing to classify socially invisible groups as particular social groups [] without repudiating the 
other line of cases.” Id. at 616.
125. Bower, supra note 108, at 182–83, 486–98; Audrey Macklin, Refugee Women and the 
Imperative of Categories, 17 HUM. RTS. Q. 213, 233 (1995).
126. Vega-Ayala v. Lynch, 833 F.3d 34, 39 (1st Cir. 2016) (holding that “being in an in-
timate relationship with a partner who views you as property is not an immutable character-
istic”); Velasquez v. Sessions, 866 F.3d 188, 197 (4th Cir. 2017) (holding that the basis for 
the petitioner’s persecution was “solely personal” rather than on the basis of a protected 
ground); Maldonado v. Sessions, 721 Fed. Appx. 351, 353 (5th Cir. 2018) (holding that 
gangs are motivated to sexually abuse “single women living alone” for personal and criminal 
reasons); In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018) (holding that gang-related violence and 
domestic violence are based on personal and criminal motives).
127. Brief for Tshiri Justice Center et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs at 9, 
Grace v. Sessions, No. 18-cv-01853, 2018 WL 3812445 (D.D.C. Aug. 9, 2018), ECF No. 80.
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lence, who do not bear relation to mainstream societal subdivi-
sions, are resultingly ineligible for asylum protection.
This line of reasoning is most clearly articulated in In re A-B-,
where the Attorney General drew a direct analogy between victims 
of domestic violence and victim of private criminal activity. Conse-
quently, other than in exceptional circumstances, victims of “pri-
vate criminal activity” could not satisfy the requirements for estab-
lishing a cognizable particular social group.128 The Attorney Gen-
General rationalized his decision by showing that victims of private 
criminal activity generally come from all segments of society, and 
thus, their societies do not generally perceive them as members of 
socially-distinct marginalized groups subject to systemic discrimina-
tion.129 According to the In re A-B- case, broad swaths of society may 
be susceptible to victimization and victims of private criminal activ-
ity “are too diffuse to be recognized as a particular social group.”130
The detrimental effects of this approach are not limited to gender-
related claims but extend to other forms of violence that do not 
align with government-sponsored persecution of well-recognized 
minority groups.
IV. BRINGING BACK THE IMMUTABILITY FRAMEWORK
In recent decades, the Board and most circuit courts adhere to a 
social distinction framework for determining the scope of mem-
bership in a particular social group. This Article outlined the prac-
tical challenges a framework centered on social distinction poses 
for victims of gender-motivated violence and other forms of vio-
lence traditionally located within the sphere of “private criminal 
activity.” Specifically, the Board’s emphasis on social distinction 
leads to inconsistent and unintelligible decisions that often un-
dermine established jurisprudence around the definition of 
“membership in a particular social group.” The Board’s use of so-
cial distinction also reifies public/private distinctions, disadvantag-
ing women who are often the victims of forms of violence relegated 
to the “private” sphere of the home. Finally, in demanding that the 
members of the given society recognize the particular social group, 
the social distinction framework undermines the core motivation 
of asylum: to provide protection to victims of systemic discrimina-
tion targeted for traits beyond an individual’s control to change, 
128. A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 317.
129. See id. at 335.
130. See id. (citing Costanza v. Holder, 647 F.3d 749, 754 (8th Cir. 2011)).
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including those traits that do not fall within the more traditional 
categories of “racial, ethic, and religious groups.”131
The immutability framework is not without limitations. Courts 
applying the immutability framework tend to prioritize harms that 
target a person’s body and sexuality over forms of environmental 
and societal-based violence, which do not neatly fall within the cat-
egory of innate identity traits. Moreover, the determination of what 
constitutes an innate identity trait is far from objective, leaving ad-
judicators with considerable discretion.132 The Seventh Circuit—
one of the only circuit courts to have consistently rejected the 
Board’s social distinction framework in favor of the immutability 
framework set forth in In re Acosta—adheres to a broad interpreta-
tion of immutability that is not limited to innate identity traits like 
gender and sexual orientation. The Seventh Circuit includes such 
traits as shared past experience or status, recognizing groups as di-
verse as “former truckers,”133 former members of a violent and 
criminal faction in Kenya,134 and “tattooed, former Salvadoran 
gang members” who had since turned to God.135 The court clari-
fied that “members of a social group [neither be] swimming 
against the stream of an embedded cultural norm,” nor does the 
breadth of the social group say anything about its cognizability. Ac-
cording to the court, the test should determine if the applicant 
who claims membership in the proposed group can establish “a
particular link between her [or his] mistreatment and her [or his] 
membership in the stated social group.”136 From this perspective, 
questions concerning the breadth of the proposed group, and the 
extent to which a specific trait is considered “fundamental,” are ir-
relevant to a determination of whether a particular social group is 
cognizable for asylum purposes.137
131. In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 232 (B.I.A. 1985).
132. Clarke, supra note 27, at 2.
133. See Escobar v. Holder, 657 F.3d 537, 545–46 (7th Cir. 2011).
134. See Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611, 614 (7th Cir. 2009).
135. See Benitez-Ramos v. Holder, 589 F.3d 426, 428-29 (7th Cir. 2009).
136. Cece v. Holder, 733 F.3d 662, 674 (7th Cir. 2013).
137. Id. at 673–74. According to the court, “[t]he breadth of the social group says noth-
ing about the requirements for asylum, just as the breadth of categories under Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act says nothing about who is eligible to sue an employer for discrimination. 
All African Americans and all women, for example, are members of ‘protected’ categories 
under Title VII, but not all African Americans and women have a claim for discrimination. 
In order to be entitled to asylum, Cece must be able to demonstrate a particular link be-
tween her mistreatment and her membership in the stated social group.” Id. at 673–74. Ac-
cordingly, rather than coming up with standards for narrowly defining the scope of the so-
cial group category, the court stated that the asylum adjudication process should focus on 
the nexus: whether or not the individual applicant can prove a link between the alleged mis-
treatment and membership in the stated social group. See id. The circuit judges disregarded 
the fear that such an approach would open the floodgates, arguing that “[a]lthough the cat-
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In this Article, I have argued that the Board should center asy-
lum status determinations on the types of characteristics deemed 
worthy of protection, rather than on the discernibility of legally 
constructed social groups. This would center questions of eligibility 
on what constitutes an “immutable” identity-based trait and the ex-
tent to which this trait is the target of discriminatory persecution. 
From this perspective, the scope of the social group is irrelevant; 
regardless of how broad the category may be, the individual appli-
cants still must establish that their persecution was the result of 
their protected characteristic. Accordingly, the Board would re-
strict the scope of asylum status determinations not by narrowly de-
fining group boundaries but by discerning whether there is nexus 
between the individual’s proposed grouping and the alleged claim 
of discrimination. The generality and broadness of a proposed so-
cial group should not be a disqualifying factor. Such an approach 
allows for more consistent decisions and avoids reifying a problem-
atic private/public dichotomy, in turn leading then-Attorney Gen-
eral Sessions to conclude that victims of domestic violence and 
other forms of private criminal activity are not eligible for asylum 
protection.138 But perhaps most importantly, an immutability-
centered approach to social group jurisprudence resonates with a 
core motivation of contemporary asylum law: to protect all individ-
uals subject to systemic discriminatory persecution on account of 
traits for which they are not at fault or which they should not be 
required to change.
egory of protected persons may be large, the number of those who can demonstrate the re-
quired nexus likely is not.” Id. at 673.
138. See, e.g., In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 336 (A.G. 2018).
